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Behaviorism in Finance and Securities Law 
David A. Skeel, Jr. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For much of the 1990s and early 2000s, behavioral economics, which studies departures from 
rationality in decision making, seemed a lot more fun than classical economic analysis.  
Psychologists had identified a fascinating set of anomalies.  Most of us value assets—whether 
they are coffee mugs, houses, or no doubt private islands—more highly if we already own them 
and are considering selling them than if we do not own them and are deciding how much we 
would pay for them.1  Israeli parents usually picked up their child on time when the only 
punishment was the stigma of violating the norm against late pickup; but tardiness rates shot up 
after the daycare center started imposing a small fine on parents who arrived late.2  These and 
other biases raised questions about the widespread assumption—which lay at the heart of law 
and economics, the dominant scholarly methodology—that individuals tend to act rationally, 
consistently and in their own self interest.3 
 
The Achilles heel of behavioral economics was the difficulty of distilling it to a single, 
coherent methodology.  “To date,” as one legal scholar put it a decade ago, “behavioral 
economics has not (and may not ever) develop a single theory that explains or predicts the full 
range of human behavior, as rational choice theory claims to do.”4  The absence of a unifying 
theory is not a prerequisite for taking behavioralism’s findings seriously, of course, but it did 
impede acceptance of the new approach.  In part because of its multi-faceted nature, the 
                                                            
   S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania.  I am grateful to Lauren Willis and to the 
participants at the Liberty Fund conference for which this essay was first written for helpful comments. 
1   This bias, the endowment effect, is one of the most extensively demonstrated of the behavioral biases.  See, for, 
example,  Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect 
and the Coase Theorem, 98 J Pol Econ 1325 (1990). 
2  Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J Leg Stud 1 (2000). 
3   For a succinct statement of the traditional economic view as it applies to law, see Richard A. Posner, The 
Economic Approach to Law, 53 Tex L Rev 757, 761 (1973) (characterizing the economic approach to law as based 
on “the assumption that the people involved with the legal system act as rational maximizers of their 
satisfactions”). 
4   Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure:  A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U Cinn L Rev 1023, 1035 (2000). 
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regulatory significance of behavioralism’s findings also was often unclear.  If chief executives 
tend to be overconfident and many corporate acquisitions are motivated by hubris, does this call 
for new corporate regulation or might a regulatory response make matters worse?   
 
These kinds of limitations have sometimes posed insurmountable obstacles for 
burgeoning legal movements.5  Not so for behavioral economics.  The biases are real, and the 
number of behavioralists on law and business faculties continues to grow.  In 2008, Richard 
Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s book Nudge made the best seller list,6 as did Daniel Kahneman’s 
latest book in 2011.7  More importantly, behavioral economics has made dramatic inroads into 
the administrative process.  From 2009 to 2012, Sunstein was the head of President Obama’s 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.  In a widely read memo, he explicitly encouraged 
the executive agencies under OIRA oversight to consider behavioral factors when they design 
rules.8 
 
In this Essay, I take stock of the behavioral economics movement, focusing in particular 
on its interaction with traditional cost-benefit analysis and its implications for agency structure.  
The usual strategy for such a project—a strategy that has been used by others with behavioral 
economics—is to marshal the existing evidence and critically assess its significance.  My 
approach in this Essay is somewhat different.  Although I describe behavioral economics and 
summarize the strongest criticisms of its use, the heart of the Essay is inductive, and focuses on a 
particular context: financial and securities regulation.   My choice of terrain is not accidental.  
Three years ago, Congress completely revamped American financial regulation, changing both 
rules and regulatory institutions.9  In some areas, such as the creation of the new Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, behavioral findings featured prominently in the debate prior to 
enactment.  In others, such as the inclusion of rules designed to prohibit banking regulators from 
bailing out large financial institutions, behavioral insights were implicit; and in still others, such 
                                                            
5   Law and literature is the leading recent example.  See, for, example, Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature and the 
Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 Yale L J 1059 (1999) (exploring the absence of a single methodology). 
6   Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008). 
7   Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011).  
8   Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info & Regulatory Affairs, to the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies 1 (June 18, 2010)[hereinafter Sunstein Memo], available at http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure_principles.pdf.” 
9   Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111‐203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010). 
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as a provision authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission to facilitate directorial 
nominations by minority shareholders, it appears to have been absent altogether.  The very 
unevenness of the assimilation, together with the richness of the behavioral literature in this 
context, makes the new regulatory landscape fertile grounds for exploring the promise and perils 
of behavioral economics. 
 
 To lay the foundation for the Essay, I begin by briefly describing behavioral economics 
and by surveying the most significant critiques of its use.  I then turn to the heart of the Essay, a 
consideration of how behavioral economics has informed, or might inform, the work of the 
Consumer Bureau; SEC rulemaking on proxy access; and our assessment of the efforts of the 
new financial legislation to ban bailouts.  I conclude, among other things, that behaviorism’s 
relevance is quite different for rules and rules making, on the one hand, and regulatory structure, 
on the other.  Although I write from outside the behavioral economics tradition, my hope is that 
even behavioralists will find the analysis to be of some interest— if only to spur them to look 
more closely at the a few of the issues raised in this Essay. 
II. WHAT IS BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS? 
The label of this new economic methodology that revels in anomalies is itself anomalous. 
“Behavioral” seems to imply that behavioral economics is concerned with behavior, while 
traditional economic analysis isn’t.  But this distinction does not hold, even as a rough 
approximation: traditional economics is of course preoccupied with behavior.  The elegant but 
misleading label honors the spirit of behavioralism’s founding fathers, Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, who called their evidence that emotion and incomplete rationality distort human 
decision making “Prospect Theory.”  When questioned by a scholar who “began to wonder why 
its name bore no resemblance to its subject matter,” Kahneman said, “’We just wanted a name 
that people would notice and remember.’”10    
 
 Perhaps the best yardstick for distinguishing traditional and behavioral economics is 
expected utility.  Traditional economics assumes that an individual’s decision making can be 
                                                            
10  Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk 270 (1996) (recounting conversation with 
Kahneman). 
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predicted by a standard utility function.  “Expected utility theory assumes that preferences are 
defined over consequences rather than over changes from some reference point,” as a recent 
survey article puts it, “and that changes in the probability of a consequence are treated 
linearly.”11  Behavioral economists study behavior that appears to deviate from this baseline.  A 
rational consumer would carefully monitor her credit card use and would avoid cards that impose 
high fees for missed payments or for exceeding her credit availability if either of these is likely 
to be an issue.  If consumers are subject to hyperbolic discounting, on the other hand, they may 
underestimate future costs, focusing far more on the current benefits of their credit card use.12 
 
In the past several years, the Office of Management and Budget has explicitly called for a 
greater consideration of behavioral findings.  According to a 2009 report, “[s]uch approaches, 
rooted in several decades of work in social science, can serve to improve rules by incorporating 
insights that come from relaxing assumptions usually invoked in neoclassical economic theory. 
With an accurate understanding of human behavior,” the report concludes, “agencies would be in 
a position to suggest innovative, effective, and low-cost methods of achieving regulatory 
goals.”13 The following year, OIRA head Cass Sunstein encouraged regulators to consider the 
behavioral implications of different default rules, as well as the possibility of an “active 
choosing” approach-- that is, requiring people to make a choice, if regulators are unsure which 
default rule would be best.14   
 
 These initial efforts are both groundbreaking and tentative.  A trio of environmental law 
scholars have recently offered a much more elaborate framework for integrating “extra-rational” 
behavior into the administrative process, hinting at where the behavioral turn may be headed.15  
Under their approach, regulators would use a two step process, first considering the monetary 
effect of a potential regulation—the traditional focus of cost benefit analysis—and then 
                                                            
11  Lisa A. Robinson & James K. Hammitt, Behavioral Economics and Regulatory Analysis, Risk Analysis 1, 3 (2011). 
12   See, for, example, Oren Bar‐Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW U L REV 1377, 1401 (2004). 
13   Office of Mgmt & Budget, Excec Office of the President, 2009 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of 
Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on Stat, Local , and Tribal Entities 35 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/2009_final_BC_Report_01272010.
pdf. 
14   Sunstein Memo at 10‐12 (cited at note 8). 
15   Michael P. Vandenbergh, Amanda R. Carrico, and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 
Minn. L. Rev 716 (2011). 
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exploring its “social outcomes,” such as people’s desire for “social status within valued social 
groups and social inclusion,” and their desire “to avoid social sanctions.”16   Although the second 
step is taken most directly from behavioral economics, the authors propose that regulators 
consider behavioral factors in both steps.  The assessment of monetary outcomes in the first step 
would include considerations such as hyperbolic discounting, people’s tendency to overweight 
the “cognitive costs” of assessing options, and the effects of framing on the decisions people 
make.17  In their assessment of social outcomes in the second step, regulators would consider 
both rational factors such as inadequate information, and extra-rational influences such as 
framing and the effects of cognitive dissonance.18 
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE BEHAVIORAL TURN 
Both the Sunstein memo and the far more fully worked out Vandenbergh et al framework invite 
regulators to consider aspects of decision making that go beyond the assumptions of classical 
economics.  As noted by the OMB report, the potential upsides of incorporating behavioral 
insights into the administrative process are enormous.  But the behavioral revolution is likely to 
be fiercely contested as it moves from laboratories and the best seller lists to the administrative 
process.  In this part, I briefly outline five possible objections to the behavioral economics 
revolution.  In the parts that follow, I consider the strengths and weaknesses of behavioral 
economics for three different facets of the new financial architecture. 
 
 Merton Miller famously dismissed behavioral economics as “a lot of so-called anomalies 
in search of a theory.”19  Miller’s aphorism captures a common objection to behavioral 
economics.  Unlike with classical economics, which offers a simple model of human behavior as 
self-interestedly rational, behavioral economics has identified a wide range of decision making 
biases that do not always fit neatly together.  Even if these findings can be reconciled with one 
another, they are difficult to distill to a straightforward model of human behavior.  They come 
off as a series of qualifications linked by “and.”  “Despite efforts at categorization,” as two 
                                                            
16   Id at 723. 
17   Id at 745‐49. 
18   Id at 749‐60. 
19    Miller is quoted to this effect in Forbes, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/global/2000/0612/0312068a_print.html. 
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skeptics put it, “no underlying theory behind why we operate under biases has emerged.”20  
Although Vandenbergh, Carrico and Bressman nicely address this concern by singling out 
particular biases, their framework does not reduce to a single theory or purport to exclude biases 
other than those they include. 
 
 Miller’s aphorism also implies a second objection.  His sarcastic adjective “so-called” 
suggests many of the anomalies may dissolve on inspection.  It is hard to imagine a critic 
claiming that decision making is never distorted by biases.  Although behavioral economists 
have often relied on experiments with students, which is not always the most reliable source of 
evidence, some distortions are well-documented outside of the laboratory.  The sensitivity of 
employees’ retirement fund choices to the default setting, for instance, which features 
prominently in Nudge, has been demonstrated by evidence of actual financial decisions rather 
than surveys or students.21  But some behavior that appears to reflect behavioral biases may 
actually be rational.   A good recent illustration is the proliferation of exotic mortgages during 
the real estate bubble.  While the surge in complex, adjustable rate mortgages that consumers 
could not plausibly honor if rates rose seems irrational now, it may not have been as  irrational, 
at least for some mortgage holders, in an environment in which the Federal Reserve had 
committed to keep interest at historically low rates and many of the consumers would not have 
qualified for an ordinary mortgage.22  Similarly, earlier studies have suggested that consumers’ 
willingness to assign all of their household assets as collateral for a loan may not be irrational, as 
is often thought, but may be a powerful commitment device.23 
 
 According to a third objection, even if decision making biases are widespread, markets 
will cause institutions to correct for them, thus making regulatory intervention unnecessary.  
Lenders’ handling of troubled loans nicely illustrates one form of “cognitive repair.”  If a 
borrower has difficulty repaying a loan, banks and other lenders routinely move from the loan 
                                                            
20   Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 Stan L Rev 1, 10 (2003). 
21   Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 105‐119 (cited at note 6) (describing suboptimal retirement savings decisions 
and studies showing the effect of the default option). 
22   As Jason Johnston pointed out at a University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law conference at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School in November, 2011.. 
23   Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 Col L Rev 730 (1989). 
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department to a workout group, rather than leaving the original loan officer in charge.24  This 
separation of responsibilities corrects for the possibility that a loan officer who was enthusiastic 
enough about the borrower to authorize the initial loan may not be able to objectively assess 
whether the debtor can repay.  Markets also may counteract decision making biases more 
directly.  If a financial institution tries to take advantage of decision making biases, it may be 
underpriced by competitors.25  If markets are competitive and corrections widespread, decision 
making biases may be less important in practice than they at first appear.  If markets are 
segmented or subject to cross subsidies, on the other hand, they may not counteract consumer 
biases. 
 
A fourth objection argues that even if decision making biases are common and often are 
not corrected by market adjustments, regulation may not be an effective response.  After all, the 
reasoning goes, regulators themselves are also subject to biases.26  By itself, the possibility that 
regulators’ decision making also is biased does not necessarily counsel against regulatory 
intervention.  Only if we conclude that regulation will be worse if flawed regulators take the 
insights of behavioral economics into account than under existing perspectives (such as the use 
of traditional cost benefit analysis) are regulators’ decision making biases a reason to dismiss 
behavioral economics.   Seen in this light, the flawed regulator objection is really part of a more 
general objection about the likely consequences of fully embracing behavioral economics.  
According to this fifth objection, widespread reliance on behaviorial economics would indeed 
make regulation worse—most likely by inviting excessive regulation.   One source of concern is 
the different regulatory presumptions wired into neoclassical and behavioral economics.  
Neoclassical economics begins with an implicit bias against regulation.  Under standard cost-
benefit analysis, for instance, a regulation is not justified unless it will provide benefits that 
                                                            
24   See, for, example, Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law and 
the Pricing of Credit, 51 Vand L Rev 1679 (1998); Chip Heath, Richard Larrick and Joshua Klayman, Cognitive 
Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 Res Org Behav 1 (1998). 
25   This argument is a close cousin to the argument that uniformed customers will not be taken advantage of in 
most markets if a relatively small number of informed customers exist.  See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, 
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va L 
Rev 1387, 1450 (1983). 
26   This is a central theme of Choi & Pritchard’s behavioral analysis of the SEC.  Choi and Pritchard, 56 Stan L Rev at 
20‐36 (cited at note 20) (cataloguing biases of SEC). 
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exceed its costs.  Behavioral economics starts with the opposite assumption.  It assumes that our 
decision making is biased, thus implying the need for correction.27   
 
While this by itself might persuade a thorough-going Hayekian that behavioral 
economics must be pernicious, for others it only begins the analysis.  Why in particular might the 
regulatory presumption be problematic?  One possibility is that adding behavioral biases to 
regulators’ menu of considerations could invite more interest group manipulation than currently 
exists.   Interest groups are already heavily involved in the administrative process, of course.  But 
the plethora of potential decision making biases might give interested parties a broader menu of 
arguments to seize in their effect to secure self protective legislation.  Behavioral economics 
might give traditional lenders additional ammunition for campaigns to cripple or ban 
nontraditional lenders, for instance, or buttress managers’ efforts to secure protection against 
short-sellers.  In each of these areas, new, arguably problematic rules might be easier to justify if 
behavioral considerations were included than under traditional cost benefit analysis. 
 
Regulators themselves also may behave differently when behavioral considerations are 
fully incorporated into the regulatory process.  If regulators were convinced that decision making 
biases were having untoward effects, they might begin with regulatory nudges, as Thaler and 
Sunstein propose, but shift increasingly to “shoves” if the nudges did not produce the desired 
result.28  In short, the assumption that decision making is often subject to biases might magnify 
the influence of individual interest groups, create a slippery slope to heavy-handed regulatory 
interference in the markets, or both. 
 
 The five objections (or four, if the fourth objective is collapsed into the fifth) seem to me 
the most serious concerns about the behavioral revolution in law.   To some extent, I have tested 
                                                            
27  See, for, example, Philip E. Tetlock P Barbara A. Mellers, The Great Rationality Debate, 13 Psychol Sci 94, 97 
(2002) ("It should not be surprising that Kahneman and Tversky's research program is more enthusiastically 
embraced by economists on the left, who have long doubted that markets are infallibly self‐correcting and 
suspected that people sometimes need to be protected from themselves, than by economists on the laissez‐faire 
right, who worry about what kind of 'micro' case is not being manufactured for new meddlesome forms of 
government intervention."). 
28  Thaler and Sunstein are well aware of this objection. They argue in response that concerns about a regulatory 
slippery slope should not be a basis for “duck[ing] the question whether [particular] proposals have merit in and of 
themselves,” that their proposals do not call for top down regulation, and that in many contexts, “some kind of 
nudge is inevitable.”   Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 240 (cited at note 6). 
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each of the objections as I have raised it.  It would perhaps be possible to continue in that vein, 
and to draw conclusions about the promise and perils of behavioral economics.  But I propose to 
shift to a more inductive mode, and to explore the implications of behavioral economics for three 
key dimensions of the new financial landscape ushered in by the Dodd-Frank Act three years 
ago. 
IV. THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
Because the intellectual case for the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that was created 
by the Dodd-Frank Act relied in part on the insights of behavioral economics, it is the obvious 
place to start.29  The Consumer Bureau had an unusually well-defined intellectual pedigree: it 
can be traced directly to two articles by Elizabeth Warren, a short article in 2007 and a much 
more extensive co-authored article the following year.  After briefly summarizing the two 
articles and the contours of the new bureau, I will attempt to assess several of its most striking 
features from the perspective of behavioral economics. 
 
The central motif of the initial article, “Unsafe at Any Rate,” is the contrast between 
toasters, which are effectively regulated, and consumer finance, which is not.  “It is impossible to 
buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of bursting into flames and burning down your 
house,” Warren begins.30  “But it is possible to refinance an existing home with a mortgage that 
has the same one-in-five chance of putting the family out on the street—and the mortgage won’t 
even carry a disclosure of that fact to the homeowner.  Similarly,” she continues, “it’s impossible 
to change the price on a toaster once it has been purchased.  But long after the papers have been 
signed, it is possible to triple the price of the credit used to finance the purchase of that 
appliance.” “Why,” Warren asks, are customers protected when they buy toasters, but not “when 
they sign up for routine financial products like mortgages and credit cards?”31 
 
 The answer, Warren argued, is that consumer goods are carefully regulated by the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, whereas mortgages and credit cards “are regulated by a 
                                                            
29   The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was created by Title X of the Dodd‐Frank Act.  It formally 
commenced in July 2011, a year after the legislation was signed. 
30 Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, Democracy, 8 (Summer 2007). 
31   Id. 
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tattered patchwork of federal and state laws that have failed to adapt to changing markets.”32  
The logical solution, she contended, was to establish a new regulator with the authority to 
provide the same kind of protection for mortgages and credit cards that consumers have with 
toasters and other appliances.  Such an agency “would promote the benefits of free markets by 
assuring that consumers can enter credit markets with confidence that the products they purchase 
meet minimum safety standards.”33 
 
 In the more recent article, Warren and Oren Bar-Gill of New York University surveyed a 
wide range of data about credit card use.34  Drawing extensively on the insights of behaviorial 
economics, they argued that existing safeguards were not sufficient to protect consumers.  The 
terms of existing credit card and mortgage contracts exploit consumers’ tendency to 
underestimate future costs.35  Neither ex post judicial review nor oversight by existing regulators 
could adequately safeguard consumers’ interests.36  Because of their concern for the financial 
health of banks, which may benefit from practices that gouge consumers, the Federal Reserve 
and other banking regulators face an intractable conflict of interest;37 and the other regulators 
with a stake in consumer regulation, such as the Federal Trade Commission, have only limited 
authority or are spread too thin.38  To solve this dilemma, they proposed “the creation of a single 
federal regulator … that will be put in charge of consumer credit products.”39 
 
 Warren got far more of what she called for than anyone would have imagined at the 
outset of the debates that led to the Dodd-Frank Act.40  Although the new Consumer Bureau is 
technically a bureau of the Federal Reserve, it has extraordinary independence.  Most agencies 
must ask Congress for funding each year, and are subject to tight political oversight; the 
                                                            
32   Id at 9. 
33   Id at 17. 
34   Orin Bar‐Gill and Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U Penn L Rev 1, 26‐56 (2008). 
35   See, for, example, id at 49 (“The prevalence of universal default clauses [in credit cards] can be explained, at 
least in part, as a strategic response by issuers to this underestimation bias”). 
36   Id at 70‐79 (limitations of judicial review); Id at 75‐97 (limitations of current regulators). 
37   Id at 86‐95. 
38   Id at 95‐95 (FTC). 
39   Id at 98‐100. 
40   The legislative history, which begins with a lunch Warren had with Lawrence Summers, is described in David 
Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd‐Frank Act and its (unintended) Consequences  50‐51 
(2011). 
11 
 
Consumer Bureau, by contrast, is financed directly (and generously) by the Federal Reserve.41  
The Bureau has wide-ranging powers to promulgate consumer protection rules, hold hearings, 
and to bring enforcement actions on consumers’ behalf.42  Only if two-thirds of the new 
Financial Stability Oversight Council’s members conclude that one of the Consumer Bureau’s 
rules poses a threat to financial stability can the rule be overturned.43 
 
 To assess the implications of the Consumer Bureau for behavioral economics, it will be 
useful to consider three different issues.  First, just how essential was behavioral economics to 
the case for a new Consumer Bureau?  Second, are the Consumer Bureau’s scope and powers 
well-designed to deal with the most pressing behavioral concerns?  Finally, and most tentatively, 
how should behavioral economics figure in the Bureau’s operations going forward? 
 
 As we have already seen, the original case for a new consumer regulator was erected on 
an extensive behavioral foundation, focusing especially on lenders’ efforts to take advantage of 
consumer biases.  But the significance of the behavioral contribution is somewhat deceptive.  
Sandwiched between seventy pages of behavioral data and a brief overview of the proposed 
consumer regulator in the Bar-Gill and Warren article is a careful analysis of the limitations of 
existing regulators and rules that sounds much more like traditional economic analysis.  The 
authors point out the problematic incentives of existing regulators and the weakness of existing 
rules, as noted earlier.44  This shift to more traditional analysis suggests a simple thought 
experiment.  What if the behavioral analysis were simply lopped off?  Would the case for a new 
consumer regulator disappear?  Surely not.  A more traditional analysis of consumer finance 
would focus on concerns such as consumers’ limited information and the possibility of fraud.  
Given these concerns—which echo the arguments that led to the creation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the New Deal45—and the debilities of the existing regulators, a strong 
                                                            
41   Dodd‐Frank Act § 1017 (Consumer Bureau entitled to up to 11% of the Fed’s funding in 2012, and 12% 
thereafter).  Skeel, The New Financial Deal at 107 (cited at note 40) (noting that the funding would amount to an 
estimated $500 million in 2011). 
42   Skeel, The New Financial Deal at 106‐109 (cited at note 40) (describing Consumer Bureau’s powers). 
43   Dodd‐Frank Act § 1023. 
44   See note 36 and accompanying text. 
45   See, for, example, Rosalie Genova, Building Dodd‐Frank’s New Regulatory Institutions: Lessons from the Case of 
the SEC (unpublished manuscript, June 2, 2011) (comparing SEC and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); see 
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case for revamped consumer protection would remain.  One could make this case without ever 
mentioning terms like hyperbolic discounting. 
 
 This does not mean that the behavioral economics is irrelevant, however.  The mandate 
one envisions for a new consumer regulator will look different if the behavioral evidence is 
compelling than if it is not.  If consumers systematically underweight the possibility that they 
will incur future fees and lenders are not discouraged by competitive markets from taking 
advantage of consumers’ vulnerability,46 for instance, one might conclude that the Consumer 
Bureau should intervene directly, rather than focusing solely on disclosure and fraud, the 
traditional mandate of analogous consumer champions such as the SEC.  I will have more to say 
about this below. 
 
 As actually enacted, the Consumer Bureau is subject to a handful of limitations that seem 
curious at the very least from a behavioral perspective.  Car loans are excluded from the 
Bureau’s authority.47  In addition, the Bureau is authorized to suggest but not to impose a “plain 
vanilla” mortgage option and it is forbidden from imposing interest rate ceilings on consumer 
loans.48  The exclusion of car loans was a tribute to old fashioned interest group politics: the auto 
industry persuaded lawmakers to protect them from new oversight by excluding them from the 
new bureau’s remit.  If consolidating consumer regulation in a single regulator like the 
Consumer Bureau was a good idea, the auto loan exclusion cannot be explained in any other 
terms.  The most one might say is that the loss is not great from a behavioral perspective.49  
Although disclosure and fraud are both concerns with auto loans, car loans do not seem to be as 
central to the behavioralist case for the new Consumer Bureau case as credit cards and 
mortgages. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
also Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 Va L 
Rev 1025, 1026 (2009) (noting SEC’s emphasis on protecting retail investors at its founding).   
46   As Bar‐Gill and Warren argue.  See Bar‐Gill & Warren, 157 U Penn L Rev at 49 (cite at note 34) (consumer 
underestimation of future costs); see also id at 21‐22 (failure of market to correct with respect to uninformed 
consumers). 
47   Dodd‐Frank Act § 1029.  
48   Dodd‐Frank Act § 1032 (authorizing Consumer Bureau to offer, but not to require, model forms); id § 1027(o) 
(prohibiting usury limits). 
49   The Consumer Bureau has recently suggested that it may seek to regulate car dealer loans indirectly, by policing 
any discrimination by the financial institutions that provide funding arranged in part by a car dealer.  See 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Bulletin 2‐13‐02 (March 21, 2013). 
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 The treatment of plain vanilla contracts is more interesting.  In the months prior to the 
enactment of Dodd-Frank, Warren promoted plain vanilla mortgages as a response to concerns 
about mortgage regulation, and she was earlier involved in a private initiative involving credit 
cards.50  Under a plain vanilla option, lenders would be required to offer a simple mortgage—
such as a thirty year mortgage with a fixed rate of interest and straightforward terms—along with 
their more exotic mortgage options.  Disappointed in the failure of the private initiative, Warren 
concluded that innovations such as the plain vanilla option needed to be imposed by regulation.51   
 
The plain vanilla option can be defended in either traditional or behavioral economic 
terms.   A model contract reduces the information asymmetry between lenders and consumers, 
the traditional reasoning might go, and makes it easier for consumers to compare options.  The 
plain vanilla mortgage would serve as the default choice, much as the thirty year mortgage has 
done in the past.  The behavioral case is somewhat similar, but with important differences.  Even 
if consumers are fully informed, some behavioral economists might argue, hyperbolic 
discounting may prevent them from appreciating the risks of non-vanilla terms.52  For 
behavioralists who take this perspective, it is not clear that disclosure alone will solve this 
problem, since consumers who discount hyperbolically may underappreciate risks even if the 
risks are disclosed in the clearest of terms.  Making plain vanilla mortgages mandatory would 
solve the hyperbolic discounting problem, but would also impose a serious cost: consumers who 
could not qualify for a plain vanilla contract might lose their access to mortgages and credit 
cards.  From a behavioralist perspective, making plain vanilla the default rule might nicely thread 
the needle.  If defaults are sticky, consumers who quality might gravitate to the plain vanilla 
option, leaving the nontraditional loans for consumers who do not qualify or have other reasons 
for choosing an exotic loan. 
 
                                                            
50   See Jeff Gelles, On the Record: How Pew Trusts Aided Credit Card Reform, Trust Mag (Fall 2010) (recounting 
Warren’s efforts to persuade credit card lenders to offer a “clean card”), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/news_room_detail.aspx?id=61901. 
51   Id. 
52   For skepticism about the ability to counteract behavioral biases through disclosure, see, for, example Lauren E. 
Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 Am Econ Rev 429 (2011); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy 
Education, 94 Iowa 197 (2008).  Bar‐Gill is more sanguine about the benefits of disclosure.  See for, example, Oren 
Bar‐Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics and Psychology in Consumer Markets (2012). 
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 Given that plain vanilla terms can be defended in either traditional or behavioral terms, 
what does it matter which perspective is used?  It matters in two respects.  First, the need for a 
plain vanilla option is much more pressing if one is persuaded by the behavioralist arguments, 
since many behavioralists are more skeptical that the flaws in the market can be addressed by 
disclosure and competition.53  Second, if plain vanilla were implemented, and large numbers of 
consumers opted for other contracts, behaviorally minded regulators might be more likely to 
second guess the choices.  They might suspect that lenders are pushing consumers into the 
alternative and more lucrative contracts.54 
 
 From lenders’ perspective, the principal threat of a plain vanilla requirement would seem 
to come from one or both of two places, both of them behavioral.  One possibility is that extra 
rational factors do influence consumer decision making, and that a plain vanilla requirement 
would diminish lenders’ ability to take advantage of this.  The other is that regulators believe, 
rightly or wrongly, that extra-rational factors are in play, and regulators may be more likely to 
question deviations from plain vanilla as a result.  In this case, lenders fear that regulators will 
intervene and impose costs on them even when the consumer behavior is entirely rational.  If this 
reasoning is correct, it underscores the risk of translating behavioral conclusions into legislation 
unless we are highly confident that behavioral factors are driving the consumer decision making 
in question.  
 
 Does the constraint on the Consumer Bureau that made its way into the final legislation—
the authorization only to suggest, not to require a plain vanilla contract—remove this risk?  
Probably not.  Although the Consumer Bureau cannot mandate inclusion, it can promise lenders 
that contracts based on a model contract will fully satisfy the Bureau’s disclosure requirements.55  
More importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act instructed regulators to promulgate rules for qualified 
mortgages and qualified residential mortgages that will be presumed to satisfy the Dodd-Frank 
                                                            
53   See, for, example, Bar‐Gill and Warren, 157 U Penn L Rev at 21‐22 (cited at note 34) (arguing that markets do 
not counteract lenders’ temptation to take advantage of consumer biases). 
54   Interestingly, with mortgages, Dodd‐Frank itself has targeted this concern directly by prohibiting compensation 
agreements from tying compensation to the profitability of the contract a consumer agrees to.  Dodd‐Frank § 
1403. 
55   Dodd‐Frank Act § 1032. 
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Act’s ability-to-pay requirements.56  These rules will function very similarly to a plain vanilla 
rule, given the benefits to lenders of qualifying for the safe harbor.. 
 
 The final key provision is the prohibition on interest rate regulation.  Traditional 
economists are likely to be comfortable with the ban.  Although usury laws are designed to 
protect vulnerable consumers, they also can make it harder for their ostensible beneficiaries to 
borrow, because creditors may refuse to lend if they cannot charge an interest rate that reflects 
the risk of nonpayment.  With their paternalistic bent, behaviorists might be expected to chafe at 
the ban on intervention.  But the case is more problematic than one might suspect.   Although 
behavioralists worry about the vulnerability of consumers who underestimate future costs, the 
most compelling evidence of hyperbolic discounting relates to the fees saddled on consumers for 
missing payments57-- the “tricks and traps,” in Elizabeth Warren’s evocative phrase—not the 
basic interest rate.58  If fees are the worry, a rate ceiling will not help.  Indeed, fees are precisely 
the trick that lenders have often used to evade usury regulation in the past.59  It is thus possible 
that usury regulation would exacerbate the very problem it was designed to solve.  The other 
major problem with usury regulation is the nature of the regulation.  As exemplified by Thaler 
and Sunstein’s advocacy for nudges, many behaviorists prefer that behavioral insights be used to 
set default rules, rather than as a basis for top-down regulation.  “[W]e libertarian paternalists do 
not favor bans,” as Thaler and Sunstein put it, in response to calls for a prohibition of predatory 
lending.  “Instead, we prefer an improvement in choice architecture that will help people make 
better choices and avoid loans that really are predatory.”60  Like a prohibition on predatory 
lending, usury regulation is invariably mandatory; it is far more than a nudge and is for that 
reason problematic even for many behaviorists.61  
                                                            
56 Dodd‐Frank Act § 1412 (qualified mortgage), § 941 (qualified residential mortgage). 
57   See, for, example, Bar‐Gill & Warren, 157 U Penn L Rev at 47‐52 (cited at note 34) (describing fees and penalty 
interest rates). 
58   Warren, Democracy (cited at note 30). 
59   To circumvent usury laws to make business loans, a prominent history of American credit explains, “lenders 
discounted a note at the legal rate, then tacked on various charges in the form of fees, premiums, and 
commissions, in order to shave down the stated interest rate to the legal maximum.” Lendol Calder, Financing the 
American Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer Credit 116 (1999).  
60   See, for, example, Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 139 (cited at note 6). 
61   Warren herself is a traditional paternalist rather than a behavioralist in this regard.  She has strongly advocated 
for new usury regulations.  See, for, example, Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi, The Two‐ Income Trap 
Why Middle Class Mothers and Fathers are Going Broke 144 (2003).   
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 At this point, it is possible to draw a surprising conclusion about the three sets of 
restrictions we have considered: although each seems flatly inconsistent with the concerns of 
behavioral economics, the extent of the conflict shrinks dramatically on inspection.  Car loans 
are not at the heart of behavioralists’ concerns about consumer finance; the qualified mortgage 
requirements and the Consumer Bureau’s authority to suggest model contracts may function like 
a requirement that plain vanilla contracts be offered; and behavioralist support for interest rate 
restrictions is thinner than one might initially suspect.   The restrictions thus pose only minor 
obstacles for a behavioralist vision of consumer protection. 
 
 The behaviorist dimension of the Consumer Bureau has grown steadily since its initial 
conception.  The earliest call for a new regulator did not rely on behavioral insights; the 
behavioral dimension was added later, with the Bar-Gill and Warren article.  But it has become 
central to the Consumer Bureau’s mission.  So much so, that the Bureau hired a leading 
behaviorist to help with its initial initiatives.62  Nor is the growing focus on behavioral factors 
limited to regulators.  There is considerable evidence that lenders and consumer goods firms use 
(and in some cases have long used) psychological evidence to structure the products and services 
they offer.63  The Bureau is likely to provide the broadest and clearest test in American 
regulation of the efficacy of behaviorist prescriptions. 
V. PROXY ACCESS 
In contrast to its centrality to the debate whether to create the new Consumer Bureau, behavioral 
economics has largely been absent from the discussion on proxy access—the proposal to 
subsidize shareholder nomination of directorial candidates.  The task in this context is therefore 
more speculative.  But it is not hard to imagine how behavioralism could enter into the proxy 
                                                            
62   See, for, example,  Maya Jackson Randall and Justin Lahart, Harvard Economist to Join Consumer Bureau, Wall 
St J, (May 11, 2011) available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704681904576317503890946370.html. 
63  See, for example, Graeme Wood, Anthropology Inc., The Atlantic (March 2013)(chronicling companies’ use of 
consulting firms that study consumer psychology).  For an argument that behavioralists have underappreciated the 
extent to which firms are better able to manipulate consumer biases than regulators are, see Lauren E. Willis, 
When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, U Chicago L Rev (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2142989). 
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access debate; indeed, the SEC currently faces a predicament with proxy access that may invite a 
behavioral turn.  
 
 The proxy issue dates back almost to the founding of the SEC.  “[T]he SEC first 
considered a rule that would have required issuers to include shareholder-nominated director 
candidates in 1942,” as one commentator summarizes.64  “This consideration was part of the 
rule-making process that resulted in the adoption of the shareholder proposal rule, now Rule 14a-
8, rule-making that resulted from the changes to the proxy solicitation process that reduced in-
person attendance at shareholder meetings.”65  Pressure to provide a mechanism for including at 
least some shareholder nominees for director mounted in the 2000s, and proxy access was given 
explicit statutory imprimatur by the Dodd-Frank Act.66  A month after Dodd-Frank’s enactment, 
the SEC promulgated a new proxy access rule.67  Under the new rule, a shareholder or group of 
shareholders that had held at least 3% of a company’s stock for at least 3 years could nominate 
directorial candidates for up to 25% of the board.68 
 
 Of particular interest for present purposes is the quick demise of the rule and the reasons 
for this premature death.  The rule was challenged shortly after its promulgation by the SEC’s 
principal nemeses, the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce, as an arbitrary and 
capricious rulemaking in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.  In a curt, dismissive 
opinion by Judge Ginsburg, the D.C. Circuit agreed, invalidating the rule.69  Although the SEC 
“has a ‘statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic implications of [a] rule,’” 
Judge Ginsburg wrote, including its effect on “’efficiency, competition, and capital formation,’” 
the SEC failed for the third time in recent memory to carry out its responsibilities.70  “Here the 
Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed 
adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified; 
                                                            
64   Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, Emory L J (forthcoming 2012), manuscript at 8. 
65   Id. 
66   Dodd‐Frank Act § 971 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a)(2)(Supp. IV 2010)). 
67   The new rule, Rule 14a‐11, was never permanently published in the Code of Federal Regulations due to the 
litigation over its validity.  See Fisch, Emory L J at 5 n 12 (cited at note 61). 
68   The rule is described in detail in id. at 15‐16. 
69   Bus Roundtable v SEC, 647 F3d 1144, 1156 (DC Cir 2011). 
70   Id at 1148. 
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neglected to support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to 
substantial problems raised by commentators.”71  
 
 As Judge Ginsburg summarized the cost-benefit calculus, the SEC justified the new rule 
as reducing costs for shareholders who would otherwise be forced to bear the expense of 
nominating directors, and as “mitigat[ing] collective action and free-rider concerns.”72  Although 
the SEC acknowledged that companies might incur costs in opposing shareholder nominees, it 
made no effort to determine how significant the costs might be.  Most interestingly, Judge 
Ginsburg chastised the SEC for “rel[ying] upon insufficient empirical data when it concluded 
that  [the new rule would] improve board performance and increase shareholder value by 
facilitating the election of dissident shareholder nominees.”73  Ignoring numerous contrary 
studies, the SEC “instead relied exclusively and heavily upon two relatively unpersuasive 
studies, one concerning the effect of ‘hybrid boards’ … and the other concerning the effect of 
proxy contests in general, upon shareholder value.”74  Judge Ginsburg’s two final criticisms were 
that the SEC failed to consider the cost to companies of special interest campaigns by unions or 
pension funds whose representatives were unlikely to be elected, and that the SEC’s prediction 
as to how many new contests would result was almost entirely speculative.75 
 
 Whatever the significance of the D.C. Circuit’s repeated invalidation of SEC rules over 
the past decade, a matter that has been subject to considerable speculation, the Business 
Roundtable case strongly implies that SEC rulemaking needs to include a careful sifting of the 
relevant empirical evidence.  Even if it was not so intended, this call may be seen as an invitation 
for the SEC to incorporate the findings of behavioral economics.  Empirical evidence is, after all, 
the very foundation of the behavioral turn.  While behavioral economics was peripheral to the 
proxy access debate prior to Business Roundtable,76 that now may change. 
                                                            
71   Id at 1148‐49. 
72   Id at 1149. 
73   Id at 1150. 
74   Id at 1151. 
75   Id at 1151‐52 (special interests); 1152‐54 (number of elections). 
76   The work that comes closest to introducing this dimension is an article by Troy Paredes, who subsequently 
became an SEC commissioner and in that capacity resolutely opposed a mandatory proxy access rule.  See, e.g., 
Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner of the SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Propose Amendments Regarding 
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, (May 20, 2009), available at 
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Much of the existing behavioral literature on corporate and securities law is concerned 
with the biases of individual investors, and thus has little direct relevance to the proxy access 
issue.77  Although less well-developed, the behavioral literature on managers and board 
dynamics might be a more promising avenue for the SEC to pursue as it builds an empirical case 
for a new proxy access rule.78  A well-known study found support for the “hubris” hypothesis 
that managers are often overoptimistic about their capacities, and engage in empire-building as a 
result.79  Other work, some of it quite early, explores the psychology of board interactions, 
including the dangers of group think within a board of directors.80  Although none of these 
studies is a precise fit, one can easily imagine applications.  If directors are prone to groupthink, 
for instance, proxy access may provide a mechanism for injecting alternative perspectives into 
the boardroom.  Concerns about status quo bias might support proxy access for similar reasons.   
In addition to strengthening the SEC’s general case, these studies might also help justify 
particular and otherwise puzzling features of a proxy access rule, such as the requirement that 
nominating shareholders disavow any attention to take over the firm.81 
 
 There are two obvious criticisms of SEC use of behavioral studies in this fashion.  The 
first is that it seems unnecessary.   Traditional economics seems fully capable of explaining the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009tap.htm (arguing for “state law” approach).  Paredes proposed the 
use of a “devil’s advocate” director to assure that boards fully consider all sides of the decisions they pursue.  Troy 
A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 
32 FLA ST U L REV 673 (2005). 
77   Choi and Pritchard’s important article on behavioral economics and the SEC focuses on institutional biases at 
the SEC, not individual investor biases on the private side.  See Choi & Pritchard,  56 Stan L Rev at 7‐14 (cited at 
note 20) (cataloguing biases such as availability heuristic, overconfidence and overoptimism, the endowment 
effect, and confirmation bias). 
78   The source of a remarkably high percentage of the best work on cognitive biases in this context has been Don 
Langevoort.  See, for, example, Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 
Transactions: Tenn J Bus L 65 (2011); Donald C. Langevoort, Diversity and Discrimination from a Corporate 
Perspective: Grease, Grit and the Personality Types of Tournament Survivors, in Mitu Gulati and Micheal Yelnosky, 
eds, NYU Selected Essays on Labor and Employment  Law:   Behavioral Analyese of Workplace Discrimination 141 
(2007); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper‐competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and 
the Lessons of Enron, 70 Geo Wash L Rev 968 (2002).      
79   Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986); see also Bernard Black, 
Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan L Rev 597 (1989). 
80 James D. Cox and Harvey Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of 
Corporate Cohesion, 48 Law & Contemp Prob 83 (1984); Claire Hill and Brett McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith and 
Structural Bias, 32 J Corp L 833 (2007).   
81   For a very different explanation of the contours of the SEC’s rule, see Fisch, Emory L J at 55 (cited at note 61) 
(suggesting that the SEC may have watered down its rule for fear of causing harm). 
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case for and against proxy access.  Advocates of proxy access argue that it is necessary to 
overcome the collective action problems that prevent shareholders from effectively policing a 
firm’s directors.82  Critics of proxy access question the seriousness of shareholders’ collective 
action problem, arguing that each firm should be permitted to decide how to handle proxy 
access, and/or worry that proxy access could undermine directorial decision making or be 
misused.83  Traditional empirical studies—such as the study singled out in Business Roundtable, 
which found that corporations underperform after dissident shareholder nominees are elected—
can help to determine whether the case for proxy access is more compelling than the critique. 
 
 Superfluity is not a compelling reason to rule behavioral insights out of bounds, of 
course.  But a second criticism might be: the range of apparent behavioral findings is so broad 
that the SEC could find empirical evidence of some kind to support any rule it wished to 
promote.  This argument is a close parallel to the fatal flaw in “other constituency” statutes that 
invite corporate managers to consider the interests of a variety of constituencies—including 
employees, creditors and the local community, rather than just shareholders—in deciding how to 
respond to a takeover offer.84  The problem with these statutes is that they make it nearly 
impossible to second guess the managers’ decision, because any decision can be justified as 
desirable for some constituency.85  Similarly, the use of behavioral studies might seem to enable 
the SEC to justify any rule it promulgates, thus undermining the oversight envisioned by the 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
 
                                                            
82  For, example, Lucian A. Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate 6 (Harvard Law 
Sch., Discussion Paper No. 653, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1513408 
(advocating rejection of no‐access as the default and implementation of an opt‐out process with necessary 
safeguards to increase shareholder power). 
83   See, for, example, Joseph Grundfest, The SECs Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 
Bus L. 361, 363 (2010) (arguing that it makes more sense to support a fully enabling approach to proxy access that 
allows all publicly traded corporations to determine the rules governing shareholder access to corporate proxy by 
majority vote). 
84  See, for, example, Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 Wm 
Mitch L Rev 1228, 1235 (2004)(identifying the concern that a multiple‐master fiduciary duty is essentially 
unenforceable as the principal objection to other constituency statutes). 
85   Recognition of this problem predates the advent of other constituency statutes by decades.  In a famous 
debate with Merrick Dodd, Adolph Berle pointed out that broadening the constituencies to which directors are 
accountable would actually diminish their accountability.  A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Power in Trust, 44 
Harv L Rev 1049 (1931). 
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 Although these objections point to serious limitations of behavioral economics in this 
context, they would not justify banning the use of its findings altogether.  If the phenomenon in 
question can be fully explained in terms of traditional economic incentives, behavioral studies 
will be less useful, especially if compelling empirical evidence supports the traditional 
explanation.  Indeed, once again analogizing to other constituency statutes, one can argue that 
behavioral findings should be presumptively excluded under these circumstances, and that 
regulators should simply use standard cost-benefit analysis.  But if traditional rationality 
assumptions are more tenuous, behavioral findings can be given greater emphasis in the 
regulatory process.  This will often be the case in the absence of markets or where market 
correctives are impaired in some way. 
 
 As the ongoing debate suggests, proxy access is not an issue on which decisive empirical 
evidence exists.  There may well be room for evidence that corporate boards are subject to 
characteristic biases, and that proxy access could help to counteract the biases.  Given the 
manipulability of behavioral findings, however, this evidence should probably be discounted 
unless is backed by realistic data on the potential cost of proxy access, and about its effects on 
corporate performance—precisely the concerns that were raised by Judge Ginsburg in the 
Business Roundtable case. 
VI. THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S EMERGENCY POWERS 
I turn finally to another context in which, as with the Consumer Bureau, Congress sought to 
constrain regulators who had been given expansive new power.  While vesting banking 
regulators with vast authority, the Dodd-Frank Act also prohibits them from bailing out 
systemically important financial institutions.   The two most explicit of these interventions forbid 
the Federal Reserve from providing rescue financing for individual financial institutions,86 and 
instruct the FDIC and other financial regulators to liquidate rather preserve any financial 
institution they take over under the new resolution powers created by the Dodd-Frank Act.87  
 Consider how behavioral and traditional economics might assess the anti-bailout 
concerns of the new legislation.  One prominent behavioral model of governmental oversight 
                                                            
86   Dodd‐Frank Act § 1101. 
87   Id § 214. 
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emphasizes the benefits of expertise, but also worries that experts suffer from characteristic 
cognitive biases such as overconfidence and as a myopic tendency to ignore other possible 
alternatives.88  During the crisis as today, the Federal Reserve was the epitome of a highly expert 
regulator.  Its staff arguably is the most highly trained of any American agency or regulator.  But 
the Federal Reserve’s expertise was severely limited in at least one respect.  Its economists were 
banking and financial institution scholars, with little apparent understanding of bankruptcy, even 
though bankruptcy was the principal mechanism for resolving an investment bank’s or a 
financial holding company’s financial distress.89  Faced with the choice whether to bail out a 
financial institution or to leave it to bankruptcy, they naturally gravitated toward bailouts.90 
 
 In behavioral terms, bank regulators’ perspective was thus problematic during the 2008 
crisis.  This does not necessarily mean that prohibiting bailouts was the ideal response to 
regulators’ cognitive biases, however.91  If bailouts are never appropriate, a mandatory 
prohibition might make sense, although even here there are potential risks, as discussed below.  
But if bailouts are sometimes warranted, a behaviorist would favor correctives to close the gap in 
regulators’ expertise.92  Adding bankruptcy experts to the staffs of the Federal Reserve and other 
banking regulators (as appears to have been done to some extent after the crisis) might more 
directly address the particular problem without removing the bailout option altogether.   
 
 A traditional economic account would focus more narrowly on the regulators’ incentives.  
In the standard public choice account, regulators have a structural incentive to prefer bailouts 
                                                            
88   See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 Cornell 
L Rev (2002).  
89   For, example, David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Phobia, 82 Temple L Rev 333, 342 (2009) (identifying this as a 
major reason bankruptcy was avoided during the crisis). 
90   Lehman was the obvious exception.  For an argument that Lehman has been seriously misunderstood, see 
Skeel, The New Financial Deal at 20‐23 (cited at note 40). 
91   See generally Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 139 (cited at note 6) (“And of course, we libertarian paternalists do 
not favor bans”). 
92   Rachlinski and Farina, Cornell L Rev at 582 (cite at not 85) (emphasizing, as a key benefit of Congress, that it has 
“the capacity to counteract the cognitive vulnerabilities of lay decision making through institutional structures and 
practices that can develop both substantive and decisional expertise”); id. at 587 (arguing that the psychological 
model views agencies much more positively than does public choice, especially if the agency is “well structured—
designed to exploit the cognitive superiority of true expertise while compensating for its cognitive vulnerabilities”). 
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rather than bankruptcy or other insolvency resolution.93  Even if bailouts are economically 
inefficient, the reasoning goes, regulators are more likely to be held responsible for a disastrous 
collapse today than for the longterm costs of a bailout.94  The incentive is especially strong if 
regulators’ tenure is short, because delaying the day of reckoning may pass the responsibility on 
to the regulators’ successors.  Should bailouts therefore be banned?  Here a traditional economic 
account would focus on whether the ban is likely to work.  Will it actually prevent undesirable 
bailouts?  Although the efficacy of Dodd-Frank’s ban is of course untested, many traditional 
economists are highly skeptical. 
 
 If we compare the two approaches, the behavioral and traditional accounts appear to be 
two roads to more or less the same place.95  Both suggest reasons for concern about the stance of 
regulators in 2008, but also offer cautions about the Dodd-Frank Act’s attempt to prohibit ad hoc 
bailouts.  Their principal differences seem to lie primarily in their differing presumptions about 
the regulators’ motives.  Traditional analysis is generally more skeptical, whereas behaviorism 
tends to assume more benign motives.96  Other than this, it is not immediately apparent that 
behaviorism offers necessary adjustments to the traditional account. 
 
 If we take a broader perspective, however, the potential contributions of a cognitive 
perspective are more evident.  The reaction of many ordinary Americans to the 2008 bailouts 
was highly critical, as captured in complaints that Wall Street was bailed out but Main Street was 
not.  A behaviorist would suspect that this perception may influence consumer behavior in 
measurable ways.  A recent study based on an on-line survey of respondents offers evidence that 
                                                            
93   See, for, example, Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Kaye, Scholer, FIRREA, and the Desirability of Early 
Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case from the Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy, 66 S. Cal  L Rev 1115, 
1140 (1993). 
94   Id. 
95   The similarities are even larger if we note that behaviorism would acknowledge that regulators may be inclined 
to avoid the risk of being held responsible for a bad outcome, and that the availability heuristic may make the 
possibility of a disaster more vivid to banking regulators than to others.  Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s 
oft‐noted obsession with avoiding the mistakes made by the Federal Reserve during the Great Depression is a good 
illustration. 
96  See for, example, Rachlinski and Farina, Cornell L Rev at 608 (cited at note 85) (comparing public choice and 
psychological models in this regard, and warning, with respect to public choice, that “a formally endorsed, widely 
promulgated model of civic behavior which blames bad outcomes on the inevitability of greedy, self‐serving action 
might itself become outcome determinative”). 
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it will.97  In one set of questions, subjects were told that they held an underwater mortgage.  
Those who also were informed that their bank had been bailed out were considerably more 
willing to walk away from an underwater mortgage than those whose bank had not been 
rescued.98 
 
 This kind of evidence would inform a behaviorist’s analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act’s ban 
on bailouts.  If the bans are genuinely designed to discourage bailouts, a behaviorist might 
conclude that they are desirable (or at the least, defensible), despite the constraints on regulators’ 
flexibility.  If the provisions purport to prohibit bailouts, but clearly will not, on the other hand, a 
behaviorist might fear that they will reinforce ordinary Americans’ perception that Wall Street 
has been, and will be treated, differently than Main Street.  The ban would thus exacerbate 
consumers’ cynicism about regulatory priorities.   
 
 These psychological effects would not fit comfortably within a traditional cost-benefit 
style analysis.  To the extent they are included, they are generally treated as exogenous effects.  
Thus, a traditional public choice model might predict a shift in the views of the median voter in 
response to an economic crisis.99  In behavioral economics, by contrast, the effects are 
endogenous to the lawmaking process and can therefore be taken more fully into account.   This 
kind of evidence may be particularly difficult to incorporate effectively into the administrative 
rulemaking process, since it raises the manipulation concerns we saw in the last section, and 
considers costs that occur beyond the immediate context of rule itself.  But it is evidence that is 
clearly relevant to an assessment of the anti-bailout rules. 
VII. LESSONS FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION 
My analysis of the behavioral implications of several key components of the new financial 
regulatory landscape suggests that it will not be easy to incorporate behavioral economics into 
financial and securities regulation effectively.  Because the psychological biases identified by 
                                                            
97  Tess Wilkinson‐Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default, 64 Vand 
L Rev 1547 (2011). 
98   Id at 1568 (reporting that “24.8% of subjects said that they would be willing to default at a higher home value if 
the bank had been bailed out”). 
99   See, for, example, William Wilson Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate 
Federalism, 41 Wake Forest L Rev 619 (2006).    
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behaviorists are so varied, they often are difficult to translate into clear policy prescriptions.  
Even with respect to exotic mortgages, where the behavioral evidence seems most robust, it is 
not always clear whether consumer behavior was distorted by biases or was generally rational.    
 
The seriousness of these complications, and the centrality of behavioral factors, seems to 
vary considerably in different contexts, however.  In this final section, I will tentatively suggest, 
based on the analysis of the preceding sections, that behavioral evidence should be scrutinized 
differently depending on the context.  I will propose in particular that alternative standards be 
used for incorporating behavioral evidence into the rulemaking process, on the one hand, and 
assessing the regulatory architecture, on the other.  
 
 Rules and rule making are what most scholars have in mind when they debate the 
findings of behavioral economics.  It is here that the uncertain significance of behavioral findings 
seems to figure most strongly.  The surge in exotic mortgages in the 2000s may have reflected 
either hyperbolic discounting or consumers’ rational response to the extraordinary interest rate 
environment, or both.  The most obvious dangers of incorporating behavioral findings in this 
context are the possibility that regulators will misinterpret consumer behavior and over-regulate 
as a result, or, as I speculated with proxy access, that the variety of behavioral findings will make 
it harder to scrutinize regulators’ rulemaking.   
 
 Given the risk of over-regulation when behavioral findings are incorporated into 
rulemaking, it makes sense to begin with a presumption against its use, and in favor of traditional 
cost-benefit analysis.  The presumption should be weakest with respect to decisions that are 
made by individuals and are not subject to market correction due to segmented markets or other 
factors, and should be much stronger if market correctives are present.  Cost benefit analysis 
would thus remain primary, and behavioral economics secondary, in the rule making process. 
 
 In the other major context, the regulatory institution itself, there is less need to 
subordinate the behavioral findings.  As reflected in our discussion of the Federal Reserve, 
behaviorism’s bias toward regulation figures much less prominently in this context.  To the 
contrary, it and traditional economic methodologies such as public choice analysis offer 
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alternative insights as to the best way to structure regulatory institutions; behaviorism tends to 
emphasize the importance of properly channeled expertise, while public choice attempts to limit 
the distortions of self interested behavior.100  The Dodd-Frank Act makes numerous structural 
changes to financial regulators that would lend themselves to analysis in behavioral as well as 
traditional terms.   
 
Of particular interest in this regard the creation of a new Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) to oversee systemic risk.101  Chaired by the Treasury Secretary, FSOC is 
comprised of the heads of each of the major financial regulators, as well a member picked by the 
president to represent the insurance industry.102  In one respect, behavioralists might applaud the 
new FSOC.  As part of Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act, which created the FSOC, Congress 
established a new Office of Financial Research that could serve as a major new source of 
information for the FSOC and other regulators.103  The structure of the FSOC itself, by contrast, 
is quite problematic.  By relying on existing regulatory heads, the FSOC’s structure may invite 
its members to simply defend the stances of their own agencies and without bringing any new 
expertise to the table.104  These impediments could have been avoided by vesting authority in a 
single new regulator rather than a council of existing regulators. 
 
The distinction between rules and institutions is porous, as such distinctions inevitably 
are.  Although Dodd-Frank’s anti-bailout provisions could be characterized as “rules,” for 
instance, I focused primarily on institutional implications of the provisions as a device for 
constraining the Federal Reserve and other financial regulators.  Despite the occasional 
blurriness of the rules-institutions distinction, the case for treating behavioralism differently in 
the two contexts seems compelling, at least in the financial and securities landscape I have 
occupied in this Essay. 
 
                                                            
100   Rachlinski and Farina, Cornell L Rev (cited at note 85). 
101   Dodd‐Frank Act § 111. 
102   Id. 
103   Dodd‐Frank Act § 151. 
104   From a public choice perspective, the FSOC is problematic for different but related reasons.  There is a 
significant risk it will be dominated by the Treasury Secretary, for instance, and thus subject to political pressures 
that compromise its independence.  The decision to house the new Office of Financial Research in the Treasury, 
Dodd‐Frank Act § 151 is another unfortunate structural decision that could undermine independence. 
